In <20030306193937(_dot_)D4198310(_at_)exeter(_dot_)ac(_dot_)uk> Adam Back
<adam(_at_)cypherspace(_dot_)org> writes:
Nodes in the received path can lie with RMX or UUCP, I think this is
the point. Ergo RMX only provides authentication when there is one
hop.
Good point.
But, as long as you can verify the one "important" hop, the RMX thing
can still do it's job.
Barring hacked machines, all hops on the senders internal network can
be trusted, and all hops on the receivers internal network (and
secondary MXs and such) can be trusted. The important hop is from the
sender's control to the receiver's control.
If there are any other hops between the sender and the receiver, then
there is a problem. Either the sender is sending it to someplace that
it should have authorized to forward its mail, or the receiver is
receiving email that from a server they trust and the RMX check should
have been done sooner.
Or, am I missing something?
-wayne
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