Nodes in the received path can lie with RMX or UUCP, I think this is
the point. Ergo RMX only provides authentication when there is one
hop.
Adam
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 05:58:05PM +0100, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 10:58:53AM -0500, Chris Lewis wrote:
And there's the rub. Anyone anywhere along the path could have forged
everything previous to them. Not much different than the issues with
SMTP.
No. Since every node personally knew it's neighbours, you could
backtrack the path until you found the node which forged.
Today, you also can backtrack, but it's useless, since SMTP nodes
don't know their neighbours. How does it help you if you have
a Received: header that reliably says that the e-mail came from some
dynamically assigned IP address in some country in far east,
no chance to figure out who used it?
In contrast, every UUCP node knew who it was sharing passwords with.
Hadmut
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