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Re: [Asrg] Whitelisting on Message-ID (Was Turing Test ...) honey pot plug

2003-04-08 05:46:10
At 09:19 PM 4/7/2003 -0600, you wrote:

Be careful what you wish for. A spammer who can't tell an open relay from a
fake one might become a script kiddie. There by compromising Cable/DSL modem
residential users to send the spam. Then there are department stores with
Internet connections which you can:

-Insert spammer CDROM.
-Turn off computer.
-Turn on computer.
-Leave department store.


I'm sorry, I don't see the problem as being fatal. I don't doubt that spammers may do all number of things that are wrong but I can't see how that leads to the conclusion that you should just let them do what they are now doing. If you believe the spammer response to losing the open relay pathway to send spam might lead them to start hacking computers instead I can't say you are wrong - I tend to think the same thing. That, though, is real offense - for that existing laws would, I think, put the spammers at risk. There's no fiction anymore that the spammers aren't breaking any laws, aren't committing abuse (I imagine the spammers tell themselves that if someone runs an open relay he implicitly authorizes its use by anyone.)

Once there is evidence that an IP is the source of abuse of the type you suggest I'd think the possibility exists that a search warrant could be issued to monitor all packets from that IP. If the spammer escapes that by doing the department store trick he's going to have one or two free shots and then the department store security is going to get much tougher and the spammer will risk having videotape made of his next attempt to steal service at the department store. If a spammer needs 190 servers I don't think he's going to hit 190 department stores.

Before he begins to rely on the department store trick I think the spammer is more likely to try a Trojan horse approach or try rooting home systems through a long proxy pathway (so he's hard to trace.) The Trojan horse, once analyzed and understood, gives a beautiful way to combat the spammer - instead of waiting to be tested (as you must for a regular honeypot) you simply "phone home" to the spammer's system and tell him your system has been Trojaned. He sends you the spam, you throw it away.

Speculation can go on forever. Spammers do send relay tests and do make themselves vulnerable thereby. Same for open proxy tests. There's no subtlety - they just send the tests - all over, every day. Do some spammers specialize in testing one part of the IP space, others specialize in testing other parts? I can guess but I don't know - the data is incredibly sparse even though it is tremendously easy to collect.
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