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Re: [Asrg] Spam, defined, and permissions

2004-12-28 09:59:41
On 28/12/04 10:40 -0500, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
<snip>

On 28/12/04 09:46 -0500, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
<snip>
And exactly how does the telco propose to enforce my 
usage of their
server? Post 25 blocks? I just use another port, or I VPN.

We could play this circle game all day. At some point you're
going port 25. If you VPN to someone elses system, fine, but they
end up paying for your traffic if you break their cap.

My point is that I control both ends of the VPN, and I have no caps at
either end.


So what?

We can play this game all day. Try to
understand where I am coming from before you decide to continue
to play this losing game and waste both of our efforts:

1. The rest of the world is the target, the 99.99999% of 
   people who simply use Windows and browsers for most of
   what they need. Not the .00000001% who are unix genii, 
   illuminati, or other highly sophisticated users of the network.
   They have their place, but it's not dictating the market.

Let me put it this way:
What I can do, a spammer can. Given that a zombied box is under the
total control of the spammer, this is a reasonable assumption.

Now, how does the telco stop the spammer from sending direct to MX spam?
Also, how does the investment into design and development into a billing
system which needs to work for lots and lots of ISPs get justified?

The simplest solution of aggressively blocking port 25 outbound/inbound
for these "users" works just as well, and does not require any major
additional investment, except some ratelimiting scripts.

   [ BTW: For the non MSEX users, Devdas has a cute "flag" that
     notes "Friends protect friends from Microsoft" it shows up
     like an advertising banner (spam) in my client - this is fine
     for egocentric discussion, but it's not a realists view -M< ]

Oh, that has been a running punchline for quite some time. All those who
read my mail with MS Outlook will see that flag.
X-Message-Flag: <Your message goes here>
 
2. Spending time developing client side fixes outside of secure systems
   is a waste of time. Market force already handles the secure systems 
   aspect.

3. Most of the solutions out there today, RBL, xBL, DNSBL, 
   etc. are well intentioned but misplaced shows of strength and would've
   been better served higher up in the network and more effective in 
   the hands of business people i.e. understands how nsp's work, capex,
   opex, operations, etc. Most do not. The frothy  (well intentioned) people
   of the early years hurt us all and made it near impossible to make 
   any progress any higher up in the network as a result.

I agree. The original RBL was a BGP based list. That idea would still
work. Kill your spammer fast or get intranetted.

4. The Internet is _still_ in it's infancy and it's made it past the
   "interesting toy" stage to a fully ingrained commerce network.

5. Anything that has the potential to impact a providers bottom
   line _and_ improve service capability will get attention. Most
   will fail. Some will be taken serious. One may even make it into
   serious consideration. 

How much more do I need to explain to you, Devdas? Every scenario you
brought up, and can bring up, is resolvable through billing, operational
approach, or regulatory action. 

My understanding of your solution is that enforcing it will either be a
nightmare, or an end to the peer to peer model of the Internet (which
really removes the usefulness of the network) or both.

Devdas Bhagat

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