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Re: [ietf-dkim] Concerns about DKIM and mailiing lists

2006-03-14 23:16:13
----- Original Message -----
From: "Mark Delany" <MarkD+dkim(_at_)yahoo-inc(_dot_)com>

What that all says to me is that we should be engaging current Mailing
List deployers/implementors. I note that the Sympa folk have a) done
some experimental DK work and b) have written some tentative blogs on
the matter.

Can we get more of these type of folk on-board to provide guidance?

Mark,

I have provided numerous times what needs to be done to our  LS product. The
link provided in Symba's Wiki [1] summarized it.

In my opinion, and its no secret,  SSP is the answer.  SSP will help minimum
many uncontrollable DKIM  issues.  SSP is what sold me on DKIM when it was
first presented last year.  Unfortunately, the deemphasis or movement away
from SSP has made DKIM a lot harder to justify.

The logic all starts by following the SSP/DKIM Consistency chart [2] which
describes the absolute boundary conditions in the DKIM email model.

In short, the responsible DKIM domain must have a way to tell potential
verifiers and "resigners" (LS or not) how to best handle their DKIM
messages.

If the domain doesn't care about potential downlink problems, then it can
only expect to be using a relaxed policy and therefore should not have any
reasonable expectation for protection.   If he wants protection, then it
needs to declares the stronger, more 3PS restrictive or none/never policies.

I disagree with Dave that it is a "complex" issue.  No.  It is issue
regarding more changes to software.   If thats a barrier, then thats another
issue.  But it isn't complex in my opinion.

--
Hector Santos, Santronics Software, Inc.
http://www.santronics.com

[1] http://www.sympa.org/wiki/doku.php?id=dkim_and_mailing_lists
[2] http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2005q3/000239.html




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