Stephen Farrell wrote:
Michael Thomas wrote:
Sorry folks, this was a very last minute deletion on my part. The
version that
Frank has is correct.
Nope. Its my fault for not checking.
> Suffice it to say, my read of the working group
consensus
was that the general sentiment of the wg would have favored (9) in
Stephen's,
but I'm not sure it belonged in the requirements draft at this time,
so I erred
on less controversy.
Fair enough. So I guess that means that maybe including Frank's
suggested requirement text would be a good idea.
As he said it:
"The protocol" MUST be either compatible with "resent mail",
independent of the signing practices of a resending service,
or explicitly explain why and when that's expected to fail.
In non-chair mode: either that, or the no-longer-there-#9, seem
not bad to me, in terms of making non-existent anti-signatures a
non-requirement. (Is that record number of negatives:-)
Perhaps what would be worthwhile here is to explicitly draw out
the list/resent scenario itself and say why it's a use case that we ought
not outlaw, and from whence a requirement is derived.
Mike
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