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Re: [ietf-dkim] Responsibility concerns with Designated Signing Domains

2006-08-26 08:57:06

On Fri, 25 Aug 2006, Jim Fenton wrote:

While we aren't defining reputation or accreditation services in this
working group, it has been widely suggested that such services would use
the d= domain on the signature as the "lookup key" for retrieving
reputation or accreditation information.

Not necessarily only that. Its just that 'd' is a verified identity
and so is good for building up reputation. SSP provides ability to
build additional verified identities (currently only identity being
talkied about is 'From'), so those verified identities after that
can also start to be used for reputation and accreditation - I
predict even more so then signature's 'd' because they are more
easily related to actual users of the system.

In light of above you'll find that all 3 of your questions have an
answer in "From" identity reputation and it will in work properly.
On the other hand its pure 'd' identity that ma have problems
especially as you alluded to in the 3rd question.

There is a fundamental difference, then, between key delegation and
delegation via SSP.  In the former (key delegation) case, the party
applying the signature (delegatee) is merely acting as an agent of the
delegator to do the mechanics of signature application.   It is still
the delegator's signature, and the "buck stops" with the delegator in
terms of who has taken responsibility for the message.  In the latter
(SSP delegation) case, it is the delegatee's domain that takes
responsibility for the message.  Some have suggested the delegatee might
want to use subdomains in order to allow reputations to avoid
aggregating reputations from different delegators (or classes of
delegators).

Some implications of this change in responsibility:

1. Responsible domains using SSP delegation will not be able to change
signing providers (delegatees) without forfeiting any positive
reputation they have accumulated.  It should really be the delegator's
positive reputation, because they are the ones acting responsibly in
their mailing practices and/or the use of outside mailing providers.  It
should not be necessary to start over if you change ISPs or outbound
marketing providers.

2. Delegators are more likely to be diligent in the choice of delegatees
when it is their own reputation at stake.  When it is the delegatee's
reputation at stake, they can always employ an unreliable party, or in
the extreme a spammer, and when abuse is reported simply say "oh, sorry"
but not endure any impact on their reputation at all.

3. We are already aware of the potential for the use of throw-away
domain names by bad actors who otherwise might accrue a bad reputation.
This opens a new possibility:  it isn't necessary to get a new domain,
just delegate signing to a new entity and "all is forgiven".

How is that different then just default use of DKIM?

--
William Leibzon
Elan Networks
william(_at_)elan(_dot_)net
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