For shame Dave. Taking one sentence out of context is something I would
not have expected from you.
When I say "It is simple" in response to Johns artificially constructed
hypothetical, this is not the sweeping statement of the universe you are
trying to present it as.
In Johns example he is trying to conflate "I believe that someone always
signs their mail" with ADSP. These are two different animals. Notice
that he didn't indicate whether the person used "ALL" or "DISCARDABLE".
He artificially gave us a binary set of choices when in fact there are
many more choices available.
The whole point of having a standard is to avoid the voodoo and
guessing. If John or someone else were really that concerned about a
particular domain's signing circumstances I would expect him/them to
contact the domain in question. The whole point of a standard is to
avoid the one-on-one checking. Now during initial rollouts I would
expect people to do some validation and checking.
You are absolutely correct that we should anticipate failures. That does
not mean we should anticipate FAILURE from a reasonably crafted
standard. We cannot protect foolish people from doing foolish things to
themselves. This is another case of King Canute.....
Document, yes.
Educate, yes.
Protect from themselves, no.
BTW John, I want to thank you for teaching me to invoke this.
Mike
-----Original Message-----
From: Dave CROCKER [mailto:dhc(_at_)dcrocker(_dot_)net]
Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2010 11:48 AM
To: MH Michael Hammer (5304)
Cc: ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] list vs contributor signatures, was Wrong
Discussion
On 6/2/2010 6:33 AM, MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote:
It's really quite simple.
This is the crux of the disparity of views.
Those of use who note that none of this is simple worry about adoption
and
success barriers, noting that new services have a long and problematic
history
and that more efforts fail than succeed.
We also note that operational details often are far more complicated
and/or
costly than designers anticipate.
In other words, as soon as the effort moves outside of a few people's
minds,
nothing about this is simple. (Well, given the track record of new
protocols,
in general and security-related protocols in particular, I suppose it
is
simple
and reasonable to anticipate failure.)
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
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