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Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM+ADSP = FAIL, and it's our fault

2010-09-14 17:43:42

On Sep 14, 2010, at 12:35 PM, J.D. Falk wrote:

...but not for the reasons the anti-ADSP folks keep bringing up.

DKIM is failing because every discussion about actually /using/ DKIM 
inevitably gets stuck in the same old argument about ADSP.  Doesn't even 
matter what the argument is about anymore; it stops all forward progress 
every time.  And we keep letting it happen -- actively participating, even, 
including me.

Continuing to argue these same points over and over is disrespectful of our 
colleagues both on and off this list, and of the IETF process.

So I'm going to stop, and I beg you all to join me.

Stop arguing, and start writing drafts.  Let us discuss the drafts instead of 
attacking each others' intractable positions for the Nth time.  If you think 
ADSP will bring about the end of all human communication, WRITE A DRAFT 
EXPLAINING WHY.  If you think something else, write that instead.

Yes, I know it requires more effort, but what we've been doing so far clearly 
isn't working.

The problem is that the two things have badly conflicting requirements. DKIM is 
based on a domain-based identifier that's independent of the From: domain, and 
that's where much of it's value comes from. ADSP is based on a domain-based 
identifier that must remain identical to the From: field at all times, and 
that's where it's sole value comes from. ADSP intrinsically conflicts with the 
original design case for DKIM, despite being piggy-backed on to it.

So any document that puts forth even basic good practices for DKIM usage for 
monitoring sender reputation (use d= to differentiate mail streams) is going to 
be anathema to ADSP requirements (d= must be the same as the From: domain).

And any ADSP-driven set of requirements (mailing lists should not only re-sign 
any mail they re-send, they should alter the From: address to match) is going 
to be considered nonsensical by people who consider DKIM a way to tie an 
identity cookie to a message.

And, as we've seen, any compromise document is hated by pretty much everyone, 
even assuming you can get there.

Cheers,
  Steve


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