On Sep 15, 2010, at 12:11 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Based on that (rather precise) description, aren't ADSP's requirements a
proper subset of the DKIM requirements? If so, I'm not sure I agree with
"badly conflicting", but it does frame future discussion quite nicely.
For example, if DKIM enables the identification of mail streams, isn't the
one ADSP covers just a specific instance of a mail stream?
BTW, one thing I think we can agree on and find value from in these
pre-deployment email discussions is terminology. I ran into a problem at the
last MAAWG during a panel discussion where my understanding of "3rd-party
signature" is what someone else meant by "2nd-party signature". What is the
real definitions of "1st-party", "2nd-party" and "3rd-party" signatures in the
context of DKIM and ADSP, i.e. in the context of i= and d= and from: values?
________________________________________
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
[ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Steve Atkins
[steve(_at_)wordtothewise(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2010 3:01 PM
To: DKIM List
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM+ADSP = FAIL, and it's our fault
The problem is that the two things have badly conflicting requirements. DKIM
is based on a domain-based identifier that's independent of the From: domain,
and that's where much of it's value comes from. ADSP is based on a
domain-based identifier that must remain identical to the From: field at all
times, and that's where it's sole value comes from. ADSP intrinsically
conflicts with the original design case for DKIM, despite being piggy-backed
on to it.
So any document that puts forth even basic good practices for DKIM usage for
monitoring sender reputation (use d= to differentiate mail streams) is going
to be anathema to ADSP requirements (d= must be the same as the From: domain).
And any ADSP-driven set of requirements (mailing lists should not only
re-sign any mail they re-send, they should alter the From: address to match)
is going to be considered nonsensical by people who consider DKIM a way to
tie an identity cookie to a message.
And, as we've seen, any compromise document is hated by pretty much everyone,
even assuming you can get there.
Cheers,
Steve
_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to
http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to
http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html