ietf-dkim
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Re: [ietf-dkim] detecting header mutations after signing

2010-10-19 08:22:11
John Levine:
There's a strong correlation between badly structured emails (SMTP,
MIME, HTML) and email that the recipient doesn't want to see.

You're right, but I think that's largely orthogonal to DKIM.  If a
message has a good signature from a credible signer, I expect I'd want
to show it to the user even if it had structure problems.  I'd like to
make the trust model as simple as possible, preferably

  good signature -> good messsage

I agree with John's earlier message that to make DKIM useful for
automated whitelisting, we end up with something slightly more
complicated:

   valid signature + good signer 
   + no suspicious unsigned content -> good message

My preference would be to enforce this within the existing protocol
(that is: send h=from:from:subject:subject...), but I could live
with hard-coded checks for unsigned single-instance RFC 5322 and
MIME headers (that is: no DKIM PASS for unsigned "extra" From,
Subject, MIME-Version, Content-type, etc.  headers).

        Wietse
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