On Oct 7, 2004, at 2:36 PM, Jim Fenton wrote:
There are use cases that depend on the relative anonymity that we
currently have in the mail system, and we should preserve that
behavior.
Can you elaborate the use cases that need anonymity? It isn't that I
disagree with this point, but that I just don't know what you are
talking about. I'm sitting here thinking, "As a receiver, I don't care
to receive email from anonymous sources."
In your subsequent comments, I think you have interpreted
"transit-time" as the time between MTA hops. Transit-time could also
be the entire path between when the sender pressed "send" or
equivalent, and when it was displayed to the recipient. This means
that it could be an end-to-end mechanism (which is what I think we
need) and not just hop-by-hop.
I agree with this.
We should probably break that question down into (1) whether a MIME
encapsulation must be required for all signed messages and (2) choice
of keying model (certificates, web of trust, etc.). IMO there are
enough problems with issue (1) that we don't need to go further.
For those of us that do not know better, what are the problems with
MIME encapsulation?
-andy