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Re: [ietf-smtp] [Shutup] Proposed Charter for the "SMTP Headers Unhealthy To User Privacy" WG (fwd)

2015-12-02 10:32:51
I've been uncharacteristically (for me) quiet up 'til now, so let me --
perhaps naively -- say what, to me, seems like a simple thing.

1.) It's axiomatic that Received headers disclosure some level of
private data
2.) It's a matter of debate how valuable that data is to those who would
abuse it
3.) It's a matter of debate as to what impact redaction/removal of that
data from message headers would cause

Why isn't this as simple as chartering the WG to go off and:

1.) Document the answers to questions 2 and 3 above, with data
2.) If they so choose after doing #1, propose remedies or changes to the
existing methodologies consistent with the data they found above

At that point, everyone can observe the data, attempt to replicate it
(almost like a peer-review process, one would think) and then the
discussion can be about whether or not any proposal that came out of the
WG meets the larger goals of the net at-large.

It seems that it shouldn't be this hard to charter them to go off and
"crunch data" and "come up with a proposed solution consistent with that
data".

Nobody's "committed" to anything by letting folks go off and work on
this. so why is there such vociferous debate over letting them go do
that? What am I missing? (it's possible I have missed something, because
this debate is the most traffic we've seen in years on this list).

D


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