[Top] [All Lists]

Re: [ietf-smtp] [Shutup] Proposed Charter for the "SMTP Headers Unhealthy To User Privacy" WG (fwd)

2015-12-02 10:59:35
On 12/2/2015 11:54 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
On 12/2/2015 8:43 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:

On 02/12/15 16:32, Derek J. Balling wrote:
Why isn't this as simple as chartering the WG to go off and:

1.) Document the answers to questions 2 and 3 above, with data
2.) If they so choose after doing #1, propose remedies or changes to the
existing methodologies consistent with the data they found above
(With no hats) That seems eminently sensible to me. I'm sure
the specific text to describe the questions would need a bit
of work, but that oughtn't be too hard.

1. That's an IRTF type of task, not an IETF type of task.

2. As sensible as the task might seem, the IETF pretty much never
requires documentation about expected efficacy.  That makes imposition
of such a requirement, here, discriminatory.

The original approach to chartering working groups was rather simpler:

  1.  Is there clear indication that 'the community' wants to do this,
by virtue of there being folk who want spend time on wg development and
they or other folk making noises about interest in implementing and
developing it?

  2.  Is there a clear understanding of potential /danger/ from doing this?

These days, we mostly stop at the first half of Question 1.  But we have
pretty much always left the question of 'efficacy' to the market.

It seems to me that #1 is covered by virtue of the request existing in
the first place.

I would argue that #2 will be covered in whatever work-product the WG
comes up with (just as any other RFC would have to document
negative-impacts, lack of backward compatibility, etc.).


I prefer to use encrypted mail. My public key fingerprint is
FD6A 6990 F035 DE9E 3713 B4F1 661B 3AD6 D82A BBD0.

You can download it at

Learn how to encrypt your email with the E-Mail Self Defense

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

ietf-smtp mailing list
<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>