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RE: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5

2005-01-26 06:58:14
Avri, the way I read Leslies text is that the IAD and IAOC darn
better respond to normal queries and questions and that they
also document the questions and answers in a public place.

If they just frivorously ignore such questions, then it is clear 
that thye (IAD and IAOC) are NOT doing their job. And if anyone
experiences such a thing, then they can raise it to public lists
and I am sure we'll get enough community pressure to do something
about it as a community (one way or another).

just my 2 cents

Bert
-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org 
[mailto:ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org]On Behalf Of
avri(_at_)psg(_dot_)com
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 14:03
To: Harald Tveit Alvestrand
Cc: ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5


Hi Harald,

On 26 jan 2005, at 02.23, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:

Avri,

--On tirsdag, januar 25, 2005 23:44:09 -0500 avri(_at_)psg(_dot_)com wrote:

Hi Leslie,

This formulation is still of the form that does not give the IETF
community a direct voice in the review and appeal 
mechanisms for the 
IAOC.

I do not understand what you mean by "direct voice". Could 
you explain?

As I understand Leslie's formulation, the IAOC has no requirement to 
process a review from a normal member of the IETF Community 
unless that 
request comes from the IAB or IESG.  To my mind, this means that the 
IAOC is answerable to the IAB or IESG and not directly answerable to 
the IETF Community.

When an individual IETF participant makes a review request, it may be 
ignored.
If someone is unhappy at being ignored they may make a request to the 
IAB or IESG for recognition.  This request may be also ignored, with 
the only recourse to that being an appeal of the IAB or IESG decision 
to ignore their request.

That is, it is only if someone interests the IAB or IESG in 
their issue 
that it forces a review.  Also the only decision that can really be 
appealed is the IAB or IESG handling of the request for a review not 
the decision of the IAOC. I am defining that this as not 
having direct 
voice.



If what you mean is that the community should have representatives 
involved in the consideration of the issues, and do not 
think that the 
nomcom-selected members, the IESG-selected members and the 
IAB-selected members of the IAOC are appropriate community 
representation, I do not see any mechanism short of the way we 
constitute recall committees that will give you what you want.

My issue is not with how the members are appointed to the IAOC.  I am 
fine with that.  My issue is whether they are accountable to the 
community or the community's representatives.  As written they are 
accountable only to the the community's representatives and are thus 
one step removed from direct accountability to the community.


If you think that the community should have the right of complaint, 
then I think you need to accept some limitation by human 
judgment on 
how much effort each complaint can cause.

I have not seen any argument that convinces me that those 
limits should 
be any different then the limits to judgment that currently exist to 
complaints, i.e. appeals, against the IAB or IESG.  I am basically 
using the 'running code' argument and asking that the appeal 
process we 
currently have be extended to this new IETF management group.


If that judgment is to lie outside of the IAOC, it has to 
be invoked 
for all complaints to the IAOC (making the system more 
formalistic); 
if it is inside the IAOC, it seems reasonable to have some means of 
overriding it.

I, personally see not reason why the IAOC is not directly 
addressable 
by
the community and does not have a direct obligation to the IETF
community.  While I am comfortable with the IESG and IAB being the 
appeal
path for the IAOC, I am not comfortable with them being a 
firewall for
the IAOC.

I do have a problem with seeing the words that Leslie proposed as 
fitting your description. As described, it isn't a firewall 
- it's an 
override of a safeguard.

A firewall protects.  As written the IESG or IAB protects the 
IAOC from 
the IETF community, which to some extent is being assumed to be a 
sometimes malicious DOS'ing environment that the IAOC needs to be 
isolated from.


I think this is a fundamental question that differentiates 
Margaret's
formulation from yours.  I also think it is a fundamental question 
that
goes back to issues in the problem statement about the current 
leadership
model:  too much influence is focused in one leadership group.  One
benefit of the creation of the IAOC is that it spreads the task of
running of the IETF to another group of people.  As such, 
I think the
IAOC must be required to respond directly to the community.

I don't quite see the logic here - we take tasks that are currently 
performed in an undocumented and unaccountable fashion and 
move them 
into a body that has oversight over them, is selected by the 
community, is removable by the community, and is (as I see it) 
normally expected to respond to the community.

To some extent those tasks were performed in an unaccountable 
fashion, 
and to some extent the Chair's of the IAB and IESG (and maybe the 
groups themselves) have been the only ones who had any 
visibility, for 
some degree of visibility, into them.

But that is not really the point.  If as you say this is 
oversight that 
never occurred before, then I see this formulation as adding more 
responsibilities to the IAB/IESG, i.e. acting as the 
oversight body and 
as the arbiter of the community's voice.  And to refer back to the 
Problem process this is adding responsibility to a group that is 
already overloaded and which has a scope of responsibility that some 
feel is already overly large.

I guess I dispute, and that really is a fundamental point, that the 
IAOC in this formulation is normally expected to respond to the 
community.  I see them as normally expected to respond to the IAB and 
IESG.



Question: My reading of Leslie's words is that "It is up to 
that body 
to decide to make a response" should be read by the IAOC as "you'd 
better have a good reason not to make a response".

I don't read it that way.  I read it as: "you don't have any need to 
respond to anyone who is not in a senior leadership position."  And 
given that the Chair's of both the IAB and IESG will be on 
the IAOC, it 
puts them in the position of saying "we can ignore it, I 
don't believe 
the IAB or IESG will back up this request for a review even 
if they get 
that far".


Is what you're really looking for a way to make that "bias" in 
judgment explicit?

I am not sure I understand this question.  But if by '"bias" in 
judgment' you mean: am I looking for a formulation that 
forces the IAOC 
to respond to every request for a review by members of the IETF 
community, the answer is yes.  And to go further I am looking for the 
appeal to start with the IAOC and proceed from there through 
the normal 
IESG-IAB-ISOC BoT chain of appeal.

a.


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