Hi Eric,
The problem is that "best interests of the IETF " is a completely
amorophous standard (In my view, chocolate helps people think
better so we need chocolate chip cookies in order to produce
better standards), so I don't seee how this rules out any appeals
at all.
This is a good point, and I could live with your formulation.
Most of the important ways that the IAOC could violate the best
interests of the IETF are (and should continue to be) captured in the
written rules anyway. For instance, any reasonable example I can
think of at the moment is covered by one of more of the IASA BCP
principles.
I feel quite strongly about principle (1), as I don't know how the
IAOC could negotiate and administer contracts if they might, at any
time, be overturned by someone else. And, I don't even know what it
would mean to "overturn" a signed contract, since it would then be
outside the control of IASA to change it.
Yes, I think this is absolutely correct.
Good. I think everyone is in agreement about this.
Do you have a strong opinion on this one way or the other?
I could live either way, but my original thought was that in the
case of allegations that the IAOC had not followed its internal
rules, the IESG and IAB could overturn its decisions. Certainly,
they can impose new rules on it through the RFC process....
Okay, so we both could go either way on this...
So, here is an attempt at some text that captures our current
agreement. I'm not trying to slip anything in here, so let me know
if I seem to be getting it wrong:
Remove the current sections 3.5 and 3.6 and replace them with a new
section 3.5:
3.5 Review and Appeal of IAD and IAOC Decision
The IAOC is directly accountable to the IETF community for the
performance of the IASA. In order to achieve this, the IAOC and IAD
will ensure that guidelines are developed for regular operational
decision making. Where appropriate, these guidelines should be
developed with public input. In all cases, they must be made public.
Additionally, the IASA should ensure there are reported objective
performance metrics for all IETF administrative support activities.
In the case where someone questions that a decision or action of the IAD
or the IAOC has been undertaken in accordance with IETF BCPs or
IASA operational guidelines (including the creation and maintenance
of an appropriate set of operational guidelines), he or she may ask the
IAOC for a formal review of the decision or action.
The request for review is addressed to the IAOC chair and should include
a description of the decision or action to be reviewed, an explanation of
how the decision or action violates the BCPs or operational guidelines, and
a suggestion for how the situation could be rectified. All
requests for review
will be publicly posted, and the IAOC is expected to respond to these
requests within a reasonable period, typically within 90 days. It is up to
the IAOC to determine what type of review and response is required, based
on the nature of the review request. Based on the results of the review,
the IAOC may choose to overturn their own decision and/or to change their
operational guidelines to prevent further misunderstandings.
If a member of the community is not satisfied with the IAOC's response to
his or her review request, he or she may escalate the issue by appealing
the decision or action to the IESG, using the appeals procedures outlined
in RFC 2026 [RFC2026]. If he or she is not satisfied with the IESG
response, he or she can escalate the issue to the IAB and on the ISOC
Board of Trustees, as described in RFC 2026.
The IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT will review the decision of the IAD or IAOC
to determine whether it was made in accordance with existing BCPs and
operational guidelines. As a result of this review, the IESG, IAB or ISOC
BoT may decide to initiate changes to the BCPs governing IAOC actions.
They may also advise the IAOC to modify existing operational guidelines
to avoid similar issues in the future and/or may advise the IAOC to
re-consider their decision or action.
In exceptional cases, when no other recourse seems reasonable, the IESG,
IAB or ISOC BoT may overturn or reverse a non-binding decision or action
of the IAOC. This should be done after careful consideration and
consultation with the IAOC regarding the ramifications of this action. In
no circumstances may the IESG or IAB overturn a decision of the IAOC
that involves a binding contract or overturn a personnel-related
action (such
as hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, performance reviews,
salary adjustments,
etc.).
[The last paragraph is likely to be the most controversial, as I am
not sure that
we have consensus that the IAB or IESG should be able to overturn or reverse
a decision or action of the IAOC at all.]
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