On 8/15/2015 1:21 AM, Stewart Bryant wrote:
Let's not boil the ocean here. Many criminals use COTS solutions.
Disabling their technology in a way that is still provides satisfactory
for privacy for ordinary citizens would be a useful engineering goal
that pragmatically addresses both their need for privacy and the
need for law enforcement.
On 8/17/2015 8:30 AM, Stewart Bryant wrote:
fortunately the majority ofcriminals are not so smart, and
fundamentally that is the edge that makes law enforcement possible.
Stewart,
So the goal you are espousing is to globally embed a mechanism for
compromising privacy, in order to catch stupid criminals, knowing that
it will be useless against serious and intelligent criminals?
Your premise that the result would "provide[] satisfactory privacy for
ordinary citizens" is, so far, counterfactual, given the many and
continuing revelations that document state-based compromises.
Based on experience to date, at best what you propose is an open and
very difficult research topic, at the intersection of computer science,
engineering, operations, politics and sociology.
The issue here is not a question of a component bit of key distribution
design, but rather of system-level, long-term efficacy in protecting
privacy in the face of sustained compromise efforts by well-funded,
dedicated and highly intelligent adversaries.
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net