Re: PGP security models, was Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-dane-open

I've sort of been following this discussion, not being too familiar with 
thinking about PGP. I did an S/MIME impl awhile back.
I would like to propose adding 2 features:
a. add a registry family that is self-signed and the members form a 
quorum for election and the family cert is distributed across many 
registries and there is eventual consistency.
b. use a blockchain to make eventually consistent and authenticate the 
quorum of members of a self-signed family cert, published to global 
registry.
I think you blockchain the self-signed, globally published family cert 
which contains quorum approval of additions and revocations of certs 
produced by this self-signed family cert with CA ability. I think that's 
secure without 3rd party CA/RevokeCertList (if IIIRC it's name).
Do you think my proposal has merit?

On 9/24/2015 7:49 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 7:42 AM, Simon Josefsson <simon(_at_)josefsson(_dot_)org 
> <mailto:simon(_at_)josefsson(_dot_)org>> wrote:
>     Tony Finch <dot(_at_)dotat(_dot_)at <mailto:dot(_at_)dotat(_dot_)at>> 
> writes:
>
>     > John R Levine <johnl(_at_)taugh(_dot_)com 
> <mailto:johnl(_at_)taugh(_dot_)com>> wrote:
>     >>
>     >> A straightforward example is that the mail system, through
>     malice or outside
>     >> pressure, does an MITM attack on users who have their own keys,
>     so it
>     >> publishes a key it controls and re-encrypts mail on the way
>     through to the
>     >> user's own key.
>     >
>     > The user should notice this since their encrypted mail will
>     appear to come
>     > from their mail provider not from the sender. (PGP signature doesn't
>     > match 822 From:)
>
>     Not really -- OpenPGP does not reveal anything about the identity
>     of the
>     encrypting entity.  If the mail provider signed the email, it would be
>     noticeable, but there is no requirement to sign encrypted emails.
>
>
> Since PGP was invented, spam has become a major problem and worse. You 
> can have unrestricted end-to-end encryption without end-to-end 
> authentication but you can't risk using it.
> Security requires a systems approach. There are very few cases where 
> you can get good security by adding one feature.

smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature