On Dec 12, 2008, at 1:40 PM, SM wrote:
At 11:47 12-12-2008, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
It has been suggested that an MUA might wish to make further
evaluations based upon the IP address of the MTA relaying the
message in to the border MTA and, therefore, this specification
should enable that by including the relaying IP address as detected
by the border along with all of the other result data. That
information could then be compared to blacklists or whitelists,
used to query reputation, etc. by the MUA displaying the message.
Do you mean that the draft should specify a new method for passing
the relaying IP address to the MUA? Can't that be done with iprev?
No, iprev would not be a good solution. The reverse IP address space
is poorly maintained which causes resource limited performance to be
reduced by an order of magnitude while waiting for the timeouts.
BTW, the information from blacklists may be out of date by the time
the MUA processes the message.
There are temporal lists that are kept current to the minute. If a
compromised system is involved, the only relevant identifier will be
its IP address.
-Doug
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