In <200507081342(_dot_)01980(_dot_)julian(_at_)mehnle(_dot_)net> Julian Mehnle
<julian(_at_)mehnle(_dot_)net> writes:
David Woodhouse wrote:
[the dangers of requring uninterested parties to change deleted]
You're missing the point of SPF. We _want_ forwarding without sender
rewriting to break in the general case (that is, unless the receiver
whitelists his trusted forwarders). We consider forwarding without sender
rewriting a broken legacy feature.
I'm not sure that you can claim that "we" want done with the
forwarding issue.
Personally, I think requiring some sort of rewriting by the forwarder
is the best, long term way to go.
However, I've heard more than a few people who feel that it should be
totally up to the recevier to whitelist the forwarder since *they*
(the receiver) are the ones who set up the forwarding relationship.
I have also seen people who think that everyone who publishes SPF
records should also do SES (or equiv) with the SPF exists: trick.
That is, if the SPF publisher wants to have allow for forwarding.
-wayne