On November 17, 2008 at 22:50 asrg(_at_)johnlevine(_dot_)com (John Levine)
wrote:
PS:
Amazon buys cryptographic cookies and puts them in the email header.
These can be verified independently by a receiver (MUA, MTA, whatever,
that's policy.)
You know that double spending problem I keep whining about? It kills
this model dead at any interesting message volume. Nice try, though.
Anyhow, again, based on that logic Amazon oughta start offering free
shipping for all orders and just print their own US postage stamps!
Whaddya think? Is it the trouble to do that which stops them? Or the
fear of getting caught?
And I do mean Amazon and other bulk email senders.
Spammers? Sure, they can try. They can try to forge DKIM headers, they
can try to forge SSL certificates...are there any boundaries here
other than striking keys?
I'm having trouble imagining any scheme I've ever seen or likely will
see which could possibly stand up to these sort of objections of
bottomless rootkitting, trivial cracking of all cryptographic
techniques, unbridled willful crime and fraud by multi-billion dollar
corporations...
And let me add that spam remains about the same problem as it was on
the day this group was created.
So what could trying to think of a new approach possibly distract
from?
Oh yeah, some confuse paper with results...
--
-Barry Shein
The World | bzs(_at_)TheWorld(_dot_)com |
http://www.TheWorld.com
Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: 800-THE-WRLD | Login: Nationwide
Software Tool & Die | Public Access Internet | SINCE 1989 *oo*
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