1. There's no way to set up a micropayment system that can't be hacked
around.
Evidence? That's a pretty strong assertion, given that we have systems like
SSL in place.
A few hundred million fully-compromised systems. Any proposal like this
must also be accompanied by a viable plan to un-compromise those systems
and keep them that way. Otherwise it's dead on arrival.
(Of course, if we could uncompromise those systems and keep them that way,
then for the most part, we wouldn't need this proposal or others like it.)
Yeah, right. Just like everyone currently replies to spam messages they get?
Yes, many people reply to spam messages or -- because they foolishly
use mail clients that parse HTML, follow the URLs given in them.
So a second necessary demonstration is that any proposed system must
not rely on end users to make spam/not-spam determinations, because
they've shown that they're pretty bad at it.
1.c. Bad guys will forge mail purporting to be from your friends.
And? It doesn't matter if they forge the identity, if they still have to
pay.
Not if they forge it from your friends' systems, which of course they
have long since demonstrated that they can do at will.
2. The infrastructure is too expensive for micropayments to work.
It is, by multiple orders of magnitude.
And so on. There is really no point in going through the rest of these.
---Rsk
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