On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 11:40, Rich Kulawiec <rsk(_at_)gsp(_dot_)org> wrote:
1. There's no way to set up a micropayment system that can't be hacked
around.
Evidence? That's a pretty strong assertion, given that we have systems
like
SSL in place.
A few hundred million fully-compromised systems.
So, how come SSL hasn't been hacked around?
Any proposal like this
must also be accompanied by a viable plan to un-compromise those systems
and keep them that way. Otherwise it's dead on arrival.
In that case, all proposals are dead on arrival and we may as well shut down
this list.
So a second necessary demonstration is that any proposed system must
not rely on end users to make spam/not-spam determinations, because
they've shown that they're pretty bad at it.
Since the definition of spam, for me, is what I say it is, you've just
eliminated the possibility of any system that might categorize spam.
1.c. Bad guys will forge mail purporting to be from your friends.
And? It doesn't matter if they forge the identity, if they still have to
pay.
Not if they forge it from your friends' systems, which of course they
have long since demonstrated that they can do at will.
The last time I received spam sent by a friend's system was... never. I'm
sure it happens, but the fact that it does isn't a consideration as far as
*I* am concerned.
And again, you're raising a hurdle it's impossible to pass. If you assume
that a system can only be acceptable if it cannot be bypassed by
compromising systems, then no system is going to be acceptable.
2. The infrastructure is too expensive for micropayments to work.
It is, by multiple orders of magnitude.
So how come we have SMS?
mathew
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