Arvel,
+1
Keep in mind that this is only true (as I see it) when both the policy
domain (822.From) and the signing domain are phished. If any one is not
phished, then there is some possibility for protection.
Do you agree with that logic?
As you touch upon in a previous post, if we can make the bad guy stay away
from attempting to forged the real domain, that would be a step in the right
direction.
--
Hector Santos, Santronics Software, Inc.
http://www.santronics.com
----- Original Message -----
From: "Arvel Hathcock" <arvel(_dot_)hathcock(_at_)altn(_dot_)com>
To: <ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 1:49 PM
Subject: RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP = FAILURE DETECTION
Major +1
--
Arvel
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Thomas
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 8:58 AM
To: Wietse Venema
Cc: ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP = FAILURE DETECTION
Wietse Venema wrote:
What was the advantage of SSP with look-alike domains?
To find large unproductive ratholes? Neither DKIM or SSP
claim to have any direct effect on look-alike domain names,
and there's nothing in our charter that says that we'll be
doing anything about that ever. DKIM/SSP are two pieces for
a much larger set of things that need to come together
to combat phishing including software layered on top of
thse base authentication mechanisms, user base training/human
factors, and law enforcement -- most of which will not have
any IETF involvement at all. No amount of hand-wringing
here is likely to tell us how this will ultimately play out.
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