Re: [ietf-dkim] The limits of DKIM and SSP
2007-12-10 11:10:04
Dave Crocker wrote:
Fraudulent From domains are a problem, and they certainly occur in
massive numbers, but if bad actors can trivially use alternatives that
are not equally protected, fixing only the fraudulent From domain issue
is of no long-term benefit.
Yes and No.
Part of investing in solution comes with an expecting there will be high
payoff. Thats a given.
In my engineering view, there is a high payoff in eliminating one of the
most obvious frauds there is that today we have no real reliable
protection against.
More importantly, when done as a group, you begin to do something that
was never done before - force the bad guy to change or adapt. Help
shift the burden and cost to the bad guy. Do nothing? Like today, the
bad guy has no incentive to adapt.
So if adapting to the other "look-alike" domains, then this will narrow
the focus of developing augmented solutions that begin to require
learning, heuristics and artificial intelligence methods.
But in the mean time, we closed one of the biggest loopholes we have
today. We force the bad guys to change - a shift in the cost burden.
As such, anything that SSP attempts needs to be evaluated in terms of
long-term benefits and the likelihood that there is a simple work-around
available to bad actors.
That has been done Dave. Unfortunately, you have your own filtering
process.
And we certainly have not done a threats and work-arounds
> analysis for SSP.
This is so not true David. What will it take to prove it was already
done? What are you looking for?
For each proposed SSP feature, there needs to be a statement describing
the thread, the way that the feature will mitigate it and some
discussion of possible work-arounds and the ease with which they can be
used.
The analysis had already been done. There were a few proposals centered
around it and the RFC 5016 Requirements document and SSP-01 draft are
reflections of that 2+ year analysis.
That said, I do agree with you there are troubling aspects of it and
they were predicted to occur by a few people in the group.
I always felt that sound engineering will engineering prevail. To my
surprise, I wonder why it took you so long to bring up a few of these
critical points that were clearly highlighted many times here. They are
the reasons why had did other I-D proposals written.
Unfortunately, David, with all due respect, you seem to have your own
process of dissemination information. I can suggest that you begin
reading input from all interested parties and not just a selected few
you deem worthy of your attention. This is not an attack on your
person, I have a tremendous amount of respect for you, but it is an
observation of whats going on here.
--
Sincerely
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com
_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to
http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
<Prev in Thread] |
Current Thread |
[Next in Thread>
|
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The limits of DKIM and SSP, (continued)
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The limits of DKIM and SSP, Scott Kitterman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The limits of DKIM and SSP, Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The limits of DKIM and SSP, Scott Kitterman
- Issue #1527: (was: Re: [ietf-dkim] The limits of DKIM and SSP), Stephen Farrell
- [ietf-dkim] Re: Issue #1527:, Dave Crocker
- [ietf-dkim] Re: Issue #1527:, Stephen Farrell
- [ietf-dkim] Re: Issue #1527:, Dave Crocker
- [ietf-dkim] Re: Issue #1527:, Stephen Farrell
- [ietf-dkim] Re: Issue #1527:, Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: Issue #1527:, Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The limits of DKIM and SSP,
Hector Santos <=
RE: [ietf-dkim] Discussing what someone said about SSP - productive?, Bill.Oxley
Re: [ietf-dkim] A perspective on what SSP is attempting, Eric Allman
|
|
|