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Re: [ietf-dkim] draft-levine-dkim-adsp-00 vs draft-otis-dkim-adsp-002

2008-05-25 13:56:32

On May 24, 2008, at 2:51 PM, Frank Ellermann wrote:

John Levine wrote:

The question is whether ADSP should define what domain existence  
means, or defer to other definitions.

Saying what result NXDOMAIN means can't be seriously wrong.

RFC 4408 uses "rcode 3", not "NXDOMAIN".  If you like that better it  
is okay, as defined in RFC 1035.  So let's add RFC 1035 to the  
normative references, and be done with it.

Nobody wanted to "redefine" NXDOMAIN, this is just a name for "rcode  
3" in a header file.

Adopt the language found in RFC2821, or perhaps reference the relevant  
section.  To offer a strategy for minimizing undesired traffic that  
might occur when dealing with spoofed domains while verifying DKIM and  
ADSP, emphasis should be placed on checking MX records first.  MX  
first is currently defined in RFC2821 for discovering SMTP servers.

Inventing our own definition is, as I think I've said in other  
messages, a rather severe case of mission creep.

Doug's proposal wrt q=mx would be mission creep, the stuff that  
didn't make it into 2821bis, and ADSP isn't the place to try it  
again, his proposal needs its own RFC.

This is to verify the Author Domain offers records required to support  
SMTP.  The first record sought by RFC2821 is the MX record.  The otis- 
dkim-adsp-02 draft includes notes to indicate how ADSP discovery  
_might_ change whenever SMTP mandates MX records for the acceptance of  
public message exchanges.  This change would minimize possibly  
dangerous levels of undesired traffic directed against non-SMTP  
domains due to email-address spoofing.  Even if that change is never  
needed, this draft clearly stipulates the ADSP related domain has  
adopted DKIM for SMTP.

Why is defining the protocol adopting DKIM in the practice assertion  
mission creep?  Defining the protocol adopting DKIM is absolutely  
essential, but this is not done in Jim's or John's drafts.  Not  
defining the protocol might prove disruptive when a domain's ADSP  
assertions are applied against protocols that have as yet not adopted  
DKIM for what might become a range of messaging protocols.  It is far  
too early to make assumptions about which protocols will or will not  
implement DKIM.  Since declaring the protocol has been excluded from  
the ADSP record, it is essential and necessary to define the  
_specific_ public messaging protocol in the draft itself.  That is not  
mission creep, that is a must.

If the q=mx recipe could be confused with more ambitious concepts  
let's use another example, or no example at all:

Implementors are supposed to know how this works, and if they don't  
know it they can read RFC 1035.

Typically ADSP records will not be discovered for many years and  
perhaps decades to come.  Discovering whether an Author Domain exists  
offers less value than knowing whether resource records essential for  
SMTP exist.  Even more importantly, when limited to domains publishing  
SMTP discovery records, the number of domains needing to publish ADSP  
records is significantly reduced.

Such testing is not mission creep.  The test is simply based upon SMTP  
being the focus of ADSP assertions.  Although DKIM can be used by many  
different protocols, what other public message exchange protocol is to  
be assessed by ADSP assertions?  Not indicating the public exchange  
protocol being protected by ADSP would be remiss.

-Doug





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