Alternatively we can allow it, warn, and expect implementers to code
heuristics that can discern attacks from regular footers.
Speaking as an implementer, I ignore l=, because the hassle of working
around it and trying to guess how hostile any added content might be is
vastly greater than any utility it has. As I've often noted, there are
about a hundred ways that a mailing list can break a signature, and l=
deals (badly) with only one of them.
Regards,
John Levine, johnl(_at_)iecc(_dot_)com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet
for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly
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