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In message <01RWUEWYVWKQ005PTU(_at_)mauve(_dot_)mrochek(_dot_)com>, Ned Freed
<ned(_dot_)freed(_at_)mrochek(_dot_)com> writes
If you show me MTA's currently advertising limits on how much they
accept, then it may be something that needs to be addressed.
But that's precisely the point: They can't currently do this in an
interoperable way because there's no standard for it.
You seem to be arguing that that a standard in this area necessarily has to
evolve from some sort of widely used nonstandard practice. If so, I strongly
disagreee: While this happens fairly often, it's actually a lousy way to do
standardization work.
I think that you will find that the very large mailbox providers will
advertise <N> as the maximum value that they will accept from good
senders (since it will cause these good senders to gracefully shut
connections when the limit is reached) ... and they will continue to
refuse to accept as many as <N> from bad senders.
Since good/bad is a judgment by the receiver (and may be a view which is
being dynamically changed by complex ML systems during the email
reception process) the result of the new system is to add more
complexity to sender codebases (because they must cope with the world
just as it is at present, alongside the new scheme).
The cost to the receiving system is likely to be small -- since I cannot
imagine that a receiving system is going to freely advertise any more
than 1 bit of information (accept/reject connection) of its current view
of the good/bad state of the sender at EHLO time.
This seems to be a case of building a cart before the horse.
Of course it is. That's how standardization is done. We try to anticipate
need whenever possible. And sometimes we get it right, other times
we get it wrong.
it's also one more step towards constructing a camel (as the DNS folk
call the issue of ever-increasing complexity in their specifications)
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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