I'm sorry I'm late, this thread was in my backlog.
On 12.03.2011 19:48, Dean Willis wrote:
On a related note, we've developed what we think is a secured mail
protocol suite. Yet we don't use it, instead subjecting our list members
(and more so the administrators) to having to deal with an endless barrage
of spam. We probably don't use our secured mail protocol because it is too
cumbersome. Maybe that should be a wake-up call for us to develop a better
way to secure mail.
What secured mail suite? I have some difficulty in recognizing whether
you're talking about SMTP + Submission + DKIM + whatever else or some other
messaging system. I agree that current Internet mail, with its one-figure
legitimate traffic percentage, is a conspicuous representative of IETF's hall
of shame.
Most critically, we've recognized that Internet users may have needs for
privacy [...] And having recognized these principles, we need to start
taking much more aggressive steps in protocol design to assure that they
are actually being met in a useful way.
I also heartily agree with this, and with all the motivations that inspired
this thread. However, I have difficulties resolving my feelings on this
point: Freedom activists in my country bring out a whole load of grievances
every time Berlusconi attempts to restrict usage of wiretapping. In facts,
this tool is a requirement for carrying out investigations at a sustainable
cost.
I think the IETF must substantiate its position against wiretapping by
providing alternative practical means to counter crime. Failing to do so
would recast ourselves as proposers of Utopian designs. And, yes, after more
than a decade of spam supremacy, email would certainly be a convincing
test-bed for our ability at providing such alternative means.
We can start by:
1) deprecating the non-secured variant of every core protocol that has
both secure and non-secure variants
Among SMTP variations, RFC 4409 is the more promising requisite for solving a
number of authentication issues. Note that it conflicts with peer-to-peer
visions à la mondonet, though.
2) not writing any more protocols with secured and non-secured variants
3) analyzing existing protocols that are fundamentally non-secured and
determine which, if any, security enhancements should be made normative
While these are certainly correct, ensuring implementation and deployment is
also fundamental. I accept and respect the limits of IETF's action, and
consider non-enforcement a key feature in the volunteer-oriented design that
is being carried out. However, we should pay more attention to the full
protocol life cycle.
4) Doing a much better job of really analyzing the security considerations
of new work, taking fully into account the principles of privacy,
integrity, and obscurity. Keep in mind that every protocol has the "good
citizenship" responsibility not just of addressing these principles
itself, but of also helping its fellow citizens meet them.
I understand this as a recommendation to provide means for users of a
protocol --either another protocol or the "end" user-- to discover in some
meaningful way what are the relevant characteristics of the current
communication. By "meaningful" I mean the opposite of those audible but
unidentifiable beeps that all too frequently infest work rooms :-)
5) Incorporating the principles of Privacy, Integrity, and Obscurity
directly into our core mission statement, into the very fabric of our
belief system, just as "Liberté, égalité, fraternité" became the driving
motto of the Third Republic of France, ending much of the abuse of
Privilege that preceded the revolution.
Yes, and, like for points 2-3 above, we must take care of how these
principles are understood by the community at large. Skepticism,
opportunism, and thoughtlessness have spread too much.
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