On 2/2/2016 4:05 PM, John C Klensin wrote:
In particular, some of us believe that the IAOC is not
working very well and that some reforms in the direction of
getting more people on it who have the IAOC among their primary
commitments rather than as a required side-effect of some other
(and very time-consuming) position.
The above is probably a better way of framing the problem than "the IAB
chair has too much to do".
Let me suggest that instead of delegating the IAB chair responsibilities
we, instead, change the ex-officio status that the various chairs
currently have to observer status, change the organizational appointees
to permit (require?) appointment from their appointing organizations,
and also add two or three additional permanent members to the IAOC,
those members to be selected in alternate years by the Nomcom.
To head off a few arguments against:
1) "But that reduces the IAB's influence on the IAOC". Answer (1):
Members of the IAOC serve as individuals. It's unclear that a different
member of the IAB will vote directly as the IAB chair wants them to vote
in any case. Answer(2): As John noted, the environments that existed
when we created the IAOC and that exist now differ. Does the original
power structure still make sense (e.g. with an IAB, ISOC and IESG
effectively owning 6 votes of 8?).
2) "Doesn't a larger IAOC mean a more unwieldy organization". Answer:
The ex-officio chairs now move to observer status and can attend as they
wish. The number of voting members remains the same. The members
appointed by/related to a specific organization get reduced to 3 of 7 or
3 of 8 voting members. Ideally, the appointed organizational voting
members have the IAOC as one of their primary tasks and would address
the concern that the "IAB chair has too much to do".
AIRC, any change to the composition of the IAOC is also going to end up
affecting the membership of the IETF trust as well.
Later, Mike