Re: [spf-discuss] SPF, DKIM, and NIH

On Tue, 6 Oct 2009, Stuart D. Gathman wrote:
(regarding a DKIM flag for SPF)
> This can't be verified until the entire message is received.
If you know there are no incoming traditional forwards, you can still
reject SPF-fail messages at RCPT TO, as before.

This would just give cautious admins who would otherwise resort to Crap
Receiverside mitigation (ie: treat fail as neutral), a way to give
potentially forwarded mails a second chance, without letting through any
messages the purported sender disapproves of.

> As to "NIH", it is not so much that as hoping "traditional" forwarding will
> become inconvenient enough to die away like open relays.
To some, the end of traditional forwarding has been just over the horizon
ever since SRS was proposed.  Meanwhile, this attitude has permanently
damaged SPFv1 by inspiring the use of Crap Senderside mitigation (ie:
never use "-all").

---- Michael Deutschmann <michael(_at_)talamasca(_dot_)ocis(_dot_)net>


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