On Sat, 24 Oct 2009 18:13:41 -0400 Barry Leiba
<barryleiba(_dot_)mailing(_dot_)lists(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com> wrote:
As I see it, the reasons to go to DS would be
Y1. to progress a fairly stable standard along a defined track, and
Y2. to review it and perhaps clean it up a little along the way, and
Y3. to get broader deployment as a result of higher maturity.
As to Y3, there's evidence, as Murray has pointed out and as many of
the rest of us are aware, that most deployment comes from publication
as PS, and from other sorts of publicity... and DS probably doesn't
create the swell of deployment that we might like. Still, as long as
the IETF considers the three-stage standards track to have value, I
think there's some value in working within it.
The reasons not to go to DS would be
N1. to avoid wasting our time on nominal advancement that has little
or no real value, or
N2. to avoid wasting any more time working on something that's not
very useful, or
N3. in recognition that it's not stable, and that, while it certainly
meets stated criteria for DS now, we think we're likely to change it
significantly after more experience with it.
My opinion is that N1 is arguable, but that N2 and N3 are not the
case, and that we shouldn't resist advancing DKIM base to DS for
reasons N2 and N3. My opinion is also that, while N1 might be true,
the fact the IETF considers it worthwhile overrides that.
And note that I'm only advocating advancement for DKIM base at this
point; I think we DO need more experience with ADSP before we have any
clue whether it's stable (or useful).
I think it's a reasonable set of criteria.
Where I disagree is that we have a sufficient basis to declare it stable.
It has not been very long at all since we rushed a new RFC out to clarify
things. What's the basis for confidence that that was it?
It is my expectation that if there are any significant warts left in the
basic protocol it will become apparent in large scale deployments where
DKIM signature data is being used as an input to other processes (like ADSP
or private reputation services). I don't see a lot of evidence that such
deployments are at all common yet. If other participants have significant
experience with these, I'd appreciate hearing about it.
Scott K
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