On 10/14/2010 07:58 AM, John R. Levine wrote:
Perhaps surprisingly, having redundant header fields does not make
DKIM break.
We must have some vastly different definition of "break".
If allowing through modified messages that render very differently isn't
broken, shouldn't we remove the advice against signing with l=0? The
advice in favor of signing Subject: and To: fields? None of those has
any technical effect on the ability of a verifier to compute and compare
hashes.
There is an enormous difference between the situations with DKIM and,
say, TLS+X509. With TLS, you take the output of the checks and use
THAT ALONE to decide to deliver the bits or not. DKIM has *never*
been such a protocol: there is a vast backstop of security infrastructure
where DKIM is a just helper.
Like I said, give spam/phishing filter writers some credit. They
are not idiots.
Mike
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