It would useful for Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) to be able to
confirm that peer MTAs are authorized to send mail on behalf of a
specific domain or network. This working group will develop a DNS-based
mechanism for storing and distributing information associated with that
authorization. While the primary current use case for this facility is to
combat a certain class of domain forgery in spam, the solution chosen
should be generally usable for MTA authorization.
A number of folks have raised issues with this section of the charter;
some of those have been on list (Phill, Hector) and some others off-list.
Working through those comments, I don't see any that run counter to
the sense of the meeting in Seoul or the discussions to date. In
coming up with replacement language, though, I confess that I keep
running into either very muddy language or appearing to specify
a solution in the charter. Here's a crack at replacement text; comments
welcome.
---new--draft--text
It would be useful for Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) implementing
message acceptance policies to be able to confirm that peer MTAs'
actions are authorized by specific domains or networks. This
working group will develop a DNS-based mechanism for storing
and distributing information associated with that authorization.
While the primary current use case for this facility is to combat
a certain class of domain forgery in spam, the solution chosen
should be generally useful for MTA-MTA authorization.
___________________________________
regards,
Ted Hardie