On May 10, 2011, at 2:55 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
Finally, this is a subject of opinions. IMV, the I-D extended responses are
focused for bad guys rejects, not good guys rejects except for the new X.8.26.
So in general, for my own system, I don't particular like to give bad guys
"clues" why their transaction failed. For false positives, it can help the
support process in a DSN, but for bad guys, its not like they will listen to
them anyway or even get them or maybe redirected to someone else. They are
going to blast away anyway.
So if you can extract how these "bad guy" transaction rejection responses can
help good guys solve a particular problem, more readers will consider it.
The problem I have with this argument is that blackhole lists, in my
experience, cause a large number of legitimate messages to fail to be
delivered. I don't think it's reasonable to assume that just because a
message fails some third party's arbitrary criteria, that the problem is with
the sender (or purported sender) of the message.
In other words, sometimes the "bad guy" is the sender, and sometimes it's the