Olaf,
On Sep 20, 2011, at 1:51 PM, Olaf Kolkman wrote:
Thanks Bob,
I appreciate your thoughts on the matter!
Thanks.
Dear Colleagues,
Based on the discussion I've updated the draft:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership
Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to
1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective
bodies.
2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide
(unsolicited) advice.
There were many comments on your earlier draft and I don't see how these
changes resolve all of issues raised. The new draft is different, but I
think the main issues remain. Could you show how the issues raised are
solved by the current draft?
For example, there seemed to me to be a rough consensus in the discussion on
the earlier draft that the IETF Chair should not be included in the
proposal. Why did you not remove the IETF chair from the proposal?
I did not see that rough consensus, but let us not argue that, I believe it
is up for Jari to say were the consensus is.
To repeat what I said, I didn't see the new draft resolving issues that I and
other raised on the list. The new draft is a different approach, but as Leslie
pointed out, it might be worse. In the old draft, the I* chairs were allowed
to appoint someone to represent them, in the new one they are non-voting
advisors. Busy people being busy, will tend to not follow or attend the
meetings. Many small decisions can have unintended consequences.
To the substance of that point: there is an argument to be made that if the
IETF Chair has full voting power than the IAB chair should so to. I believe
that it is beneficial for the organization if there is some symmetry there.
For completeness, and in relation to that symmetry argument. Jari wrote in
another mail:
And if the chairs have to be voting members in IAOC, why aren't they voting
members in IAB and IESG?
The IETF Chair is voting (full) member of the IAB (see section 1.1 of RFC
2850)
The IAB Chair is ex-officio member of the IESG (see RFC3710 section 2) but
for Decision making the IAB chair is excluded from the consensus process
(RFC3710 section 3.1 2nd paragraph). The obvious reason for that is that the
IAB is in the appeal chain.
I am not sure I understand the point here. Further, isn't this cross
membership another cause of I* chair overload? Why not eliminate that too?
Why are you only considering the IAOC roles? Why is the IETF chair a member of
the IAB and why does the IAB chair attend IESG meetings? Wouldn't the reduce
their load too? They could appoint a liaison? Same for the ISOC CEO.
I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping
a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes
if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required
from a diligent voting member.
As I said earlier, I continue to think this is a bad idea. We now have a
system that works well. Certainly not perfect, but I am concerned your
proposed changes will make it work worse.
At some point I'd be perfectly happy to agree to disagree on the merit of the
idea. But I want to understand the motivation and make sure there is nothing
actionable on my side.
Other than dropping the proposal :-)
I agree there is a problem with I* chair overload, but you have proposed a
point solution without having the general discussion. It would be better if
the community had that discussion before evaluating solutions.
In my time as IAOC chair, the I* chairs have been actively involved in the
most significant decisions the IAOC makes, they tend to be less active in
many of the day to day operational issues. For example, there are weekly
calls in the months before an IETF meeting that the host, NOC team, IAD,
host, and other people attend. I don't think an I* chair has been involved
at this level. Also, the IAOC has several subcommittees (e.g., meetings,
budget, specific RFPs, and Tools). I* chair attendance in these varies.
The IETF chair is very active in the RFP subcommittee and Tools. The ISOC
chair has reduced her attendance in the subcommittees.
There is no requirement that members of committees are IAOC members, is there?
It's usually a mix of IAOC members and invited members. The subcommittees make
recommendations to the IAOC, the IAOC make the decision.
I think the I* chairs bring a broad view of the community and operational
needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than other appointees
would not have. In order for the I* chairs to be effective, they will need
to be involved. If they are involved, then they might as well be voting
members.
With the changes you propose we could end up with an IAOC that none of the
I* chairs participate. As you point out, they are all busy and will have a
hard time to following the issues if their involvement is optional. This
will result in an IAOC that is disconnected from the community.
I do not buy that argument. If the I* chairs are vital for the connect with
the community we have a different problem.
It's also important that the IAOC is well connected to what the IESG and IAB
are thinking. We get that now by having the IETF and IAB chairs be voting
members of the IAOC and IETF Trust. Your proposal breaks that link and over
time I think the IETF as a whole will suffer.
It is important for the I* chairs to be connected with the community.
It is important for the IAOC to be connected with the community.
It is important for the I* chairs to be informed about what is happening in
the IAOC
It is important for the IAOC to be informed about what the I* chairs find
important.
Yes, but I don't understand your point. We get that today with the current
makeup. Your proposal breaks these links.
I think it's very important for the I* chairs to share the responsibility
for IAOC decisions by being voting members.
Why?
So we don't have the IESG and IAB having disputes with the IAOC. Having the
IETF and IAB chairs share the decisions avoids a lot of this. I think you are
aware of a few times where we got close to this and I think the current
structure helped avoid it.
Same for the IETF Trust, your proposal would result in the I* chairs not
being members of the IETF Trust (unless the Trust was changed, another issue
in itself).
The current structure with the I* chairs being voting members of the IAOC
has worked well. The I* members are involved in the important decisions,
share the responsibility for the decisions, and keep the IAOC/IASA connected
to the community.
I am sympathetic to the issue this draft is attempting to resolve, but I
think there are better ways to reduce the load we put on the I* chairs, than
what this draft proposes.
It would help if you would share those ideas.
I will. I don't claim to have perfect solutions, but I think there are a number
of approaches that we should start discussing. I will do this in a separate
email with a new subject field.
Bob
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