John,
I don't see how you took what I said and then interpreted it as suggesting that
I was saying proposing an "absolute dictatorship". You do have a good
imagination :-)
Also, I have been proposing some other ways of solving the I* overload problems
as you suggested, except that I don't think the solution to the I* overload
problem is in the IASA.
If we (the community) are going to solve the I* overload problem, it would be
good to have some actual data on how the I* chairs spend their time. It would
be good to have a better understanding of the problem before proposing
solutions.
Bob
--On Friday, September 23, 2011 11:04 +0300 Bob Hinden
<bob(_dot_)hinden(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com> wrote:
I also claim that for the third item there is no necessity
for the I* chairs to be a voting member, nor for the fourth.
That said, I am sensitive to the argument that if I* chairs
are members they may actually pay more attention (human
nature and such) and that being effective at those item
without being a member is tough.
I theory I can agree, but in practice I think the more
separation there is the more likelihood for organizational
problems.
...
Bob,
Of course. But that is just a corollary to an old principle
that, if one wants a really efficient government, with minimal
chances of "organizational problems", the most efficient form is
an absolute dictatorship (or an absolute monarchy) with one
person in charge of, and responsible for, everything. As long
as that person is competent and has the bandwidth, things are
nothing if not efficient and, some aesthetic and moral issues
aside, the only major disadvantages are that there is a single
point of failure for the entire system and recruiting
appropriate dictators (or monarchs) has a long history of being
problematic.
We have chosen, I think for really good reasons, to avoid that
sort of model. That --almost inherently-- means that there will
be some inefficiency and some risk of organizational problems.
Frankly, I'd rather have that risk in the IASA, than having it
affect the ability of the IAB and IESG to do substantive
(standards and external relationship) work. That doesn't mean I
want an inefficient and organizationally-troubled IASA, only
that, if there is pain, I think that the IASA --which, should it
become necessary, is also more easily reorganized without
significant disruption to the IETF's work than the IESG or IAB--
is the right place to feel, and deal with, that pain. For that
reason, I'd much prefer to to have IASA leaders saying "well
this might be bad for the IASA, but we've thought about it and
these are ways to make the best of a bad situation" rather than
what often seem to be variations on a theme of "the IASA (IAOC,
Trust) are so much more important than anything else that, if
something has to suffer inefficiency or organizational problems,
it should obviously be the IAB and IESG".
I don't think you really intend to say that, but it is what some
of your (and other) comments come out sounding like. YMMD.
john
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