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Re: [ietf-dkim] Wrong Discussion - was Why mailing lists should strip DKIM signatures

2010-04-30 13:15:30
On 4/30/10 8:48 AM, Michael Thomas wrote:
On 04/30/2010 08:32 AM, Jeff Macdonald wrote:
   
Perhaps poorly chosen words. But I think most understood the intent.
I'm willing to go from a world where any system can use my From to one
where only the systems I say can. And that means changes.
     
Really? The sender has to opt in? That sounds like a lot of operational
burden on the sender admins. To me that says that I'd need to get blessing
from my mail admins to start posting to a new list/domain. Which is a pretty
big change from the way things are now. And to my mind a little bit scary.
   
Why not, when a sender authorization scheme can be unilaterally enacted 
in milliseconds with a simple request, either in the form of an email or 
a web-page. This would be a request to grant specific exceptions in the 
domain's "discard-able" or "all" policy by publishing a hash label.

In the case of financial institutions, before taking such step, any 
authorized third-party should be audited.  This would be easier to do 
with DKIM than with SPF because a server's range of permitted sources is 
not determined with a simple message probe.   With DKIM, testing the 
handling of submissions from different accounts would offer reasonably 
assurance an authorization does not permit exploitations.

By implementing a third-party authorization scheme with DKIM, tighter 
restrictions become possible with fewer messages lost.  A DKIM 
authorization scheme would also put the burden of knowing who can be 
trusted to properly handle A-R headers and message bodies on to the 
senders seeking protections afforded by  "all" or "discard-able" ADSP 
policy.

-Doug
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