At 01:05 19-09-2011, Olaf Kolkman wrote:
As far as I understand the trust agreement the
voting members and the IAD are members of the
trust. If the 'chairs' are non-voting members of
the IAOC then the idea is that they would not be
trustees and a modification of the trust
agreement is not needed. That can be clarified.
The IETF Administrative Director serves, ex
officio, as a non-voting member of the IAOC. He
is still considered as part of the IAOC
membership and is an eligible person. As such he
is permitted to become a Trustee. Section 2.1 of
draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership-01 states that:
"They are not members of the Trust."
Section 2.3 of the draft defines who are the
trustees. The IAD makes the matter somewhat
complicated if you want the fix to be through BCP
101. I suggest asking the IETF Counsel for advice about the correct fix.
Section 2.1 mentions that:
"They are explicity invited to all of the IAOC and Trust activities,
including executive sessions, and have the right to advice, solicited
or not."
The IETF Trust side may be a problem. Once
again, I suggest asking IETF Counsel for advice.
The IETF Trust monthly meetings last around 15
minutes. Given that it is the body responsible
for handling DMCA Take Down Notices (curiously,
the IAOC seems to be dealing with that), it is
hard to say whether it is important or not for
the IAB Chair, the IETF Chair and the ISOC President to be trustees.
At 05:17 19-09-2011, Bob Hinden wrote:
For example, there seemed to me to be a rough
consensus in the discussion on the earlier draft
that the IETF Chair should not be included in
the proposal. Why did you not remove the IETF chair from the proposal?
If I recall correctly, Russ said that he can put in the time.
With the changes you propose we could end up
with an IAOC that none of the I* chairs
participate. As you point out, they are all
busy and will have a hard time to following the
issues if their involvement is optional. This
will result in an IAOC that is disconnected from the community.
I think it's very important for the I* chairs to
share the responsibility for IAOC decisions by
being voting members. Same for the IETF Trust,
your proposal would result in the I* chairs not
being members of the IETF Trust (unless the
Trust was changed, another issue in itself).
If I understand the argument, it is about having
the I* chairs share the responsibility through their vote.
draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership-00 was
based on delegation. This revision gives the I*
chairs the same standing as the IAD.
At 05:35 19-09-2011, jonne(_dot_)soininen(_at_)renesasmobile(_dot_)com wrote:
Anyways, I thank Olaf of bringing up this real problem: the IAOC is a lot
of work measured in time, and effort. At least, when I was there, I think
it was too much work for people who were already busy in so many other
ways.
However, I think the solution is a bit "menemistä perse edellä puuhun" (==
putting the cart before the horse): The IAOC should be a _strategic_ body
that gives a direction for the administration of the IETF. Basically IAOC
is the closest you have to the board of the IETF (financial management,
asset management, management of the operations). Therefore, by design, you
have the stakeholders represented in the body (the main chairs, the
president and CEO of ISOC).
This is odd. IASA was described as an
administrative support structure. The above
argues that it should act as a board of the
IETF. It looks like two diametrically opposed
perspectives. I don't think that the IAOC is the
right forum to decide on policies about compliance with government regulations.
At 06:10 19-09-2011, Jari Arkko wrote:
I understand the point about chairs being
involved. But I'm also sure there will never be
an IAB/IETF chair who would ignore important
IAOC business. This draft is about the ability
(but not a requirement) of the chairs to
delegate most of the day-to-day business and
just stay on for the important stuff. One
practical issue is that if the chairs under
Appendix A.1 lists a change from a delegation model to ex-officio non-voting.
At 08:05 19-09-2011, Sam Hartman wrote:
Presumably the delegate would be subject to recall through the normal
recall process (as are all IAOC members today except for the ISOC
president)
You should spell out things like whether the delegating IAOC member may
recall their delegation and whether the body (IAB/IESG) may recall the
delegate.
The bodies which appointed IAOC members cannot recall them.
A Recall is a strong action. Given that the IAOC
makes decisions by committee, it would be
difficult to pinpoint the responsibility for a
decision on an individual. You can always recall
the IAOC Chair. However, I'll point out that he
has one vote and there isn't much he can do if
the majority is against him. The IAOC does not require consensus.
At 11:04 19-09-2011, Marshall Eubanks wrote:
- If the IAOC or the Trust requires knowledge of
IESG or IAB plans, intentions, thinking, etc..
the new member / Trustee will not have the
knowledge of the corresponding I* Chair. This
will lower the efficiency of the IAOC and Trust,
almost proportionally to the time saved. (If the
I* chair is in every meeting, then there is no
loss of efficiency but also no savings of time.)
If the loss of efficiency is bad enough, this may not be sustainable.
This is an interesting point. Bob Hinden was
appointed by the IAB and Ole Jacobsen was
appointed by the IESG. They are not members of
the IAB or the IESG. As such they may not be
aware of the intentions or thinking of these two
bodies (please feel free to correct me).
At 11:16 19-09-2011, Dave CROCKER wrote:
I meant to explain the subtlety about the I*
perspective that took me awhile to understand:
I initial assumed their contribution was
insight about the respective I* body. On that
basis, having another member from that same body ought to be reasonable.
What I've found, instead, is that
specifically the chairs have a much broader
perspective and offer comments on on IETF and
non-IETF /community/ issues that a random
member of their body is not likely to have.
And this brings us back to the current
situation. Section 1 of the draft mentions that:
"On the other hand, a lot of the IAOC work is 'business as usual' and
presence of I-Chairs is not always required if it were not for the
reasonable due dilligence requirements that come with being a voting
member."
Bernard Aboba is the (new) IAB Chair. He was
once a member of the IAB. As this is the IETF
politics mailing list, I gather there isn't a
requirement for absolute political
correctness. Ignoring the individual angle, I
assume that the new IAB Chair would have a less
broad perspective as he is new to the job.
RFC 4071 was published in April 2005. Olaf has
been IAB Chair from 2007 to 2011. Russ has been
IETF Chair for the same period. They should have
a broader perspective of the community issues.
At 11:49 19-09-2011, John C Klensin wrote:
While I think it would be reasonable to add a few paragraphs to
this proposal reminding the IESG, IAB, and ISOC how important
continuity of knowledge is, I think we can actually trust all
three of those bodies to figure that out and act sensibly. Do
If the continuity of knowledge is to be embodied
by Olaf and Russ, I think that it can be a
problem for the IETF in the long run.
Look at one of the arguments from a different
perspective, it could be put as having five
voting members of the IAOC who cannot prevent the
IAOC from being disconnected with the community.
Regards,
-sm
_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf